

Approved For Release 2000/08/05 : CIA-RDP85T00876R000600030017-4

#2878

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

1 OF 1

1 JULY 1970

Confidential



TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential


1 July 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 26)

CONFIDENTIAL

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention 1

INDOCHINA

President's 30 June Report, Cambodian Policy Scored 1
Communist Claims of Military Success in Cambodia 5
Paris Talks: Routine Claims, Charges at 25 June Session 7
Sihanouk Concludes State Visit to North Korea 9
Ministers of Sihanouk Government in USSR, UAR 9
Djakarta Conference Mission's Moscow Visit Noted by USSR, PRC . . . 10
Moscow Continues Polemic on Peking's Indochina Stand 12
DRV National Assembly Delegation Stops in PRC, USSR 12
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denounces U.S. Attacks on DRV 13
Instructions on Attacking Vietnam District Capitals 14

KOREAN WAR ANNIVERSARY

Fanfare From Peking and Pyongyang, Routine Moscow Observance . . . 16

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PRC Decries U.S. "Occupation" of Taiwan on Anniversary 19
Peking Calls for Peaceful Coexistence With United States 21
Routine Calls for Taiwan Liberation Show Little Urgency 22

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

Low-Volume Soviet Comment on SALT Continues Attacks on Laird . . . 24

EUROPEAN SECURITY

Pact Document Breaks New Ground on Conference Makeup, Agenda . . . 25

MIDDLE EAST

Moscow Restrained on New U.S. Peace Initiative 28
Nasir Arrives in Moscow for "Friendly Visit" 30

U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY

Treaty Extension Occasions New Warnings of Threat to Peace 33

LATIN AMERICA

Havana Applauds Tactics of Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay 36

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

C O N T E N T S (Continued)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Hardliners Denounce Dubcek; Husak Hints at Trial	39
Italian, British Communists "Regret" Dubcek Expulsion	40

YUGOSLAVIA AND USSR

Ribicic Moscow Visit Reflects Improvement in State Relations	42
--	----

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Brezhnev's War Role Played Up by OGONEK, Otherwise Ignored	45
--	----

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Joint Editorial Released for Party Anniversary	47
Topics in Brief	47
Status of Yeh Chun	
Leap Forward Planning	
Summer Crops	

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- i -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 22 - 28 JUNE 1970

<u>Moscow (3812 items)</u>			<u>Peking (2774 items)</u>		
Pakistan President	(0.2%)	11%	Korean War & Taiwan	(--)	51%
Khan in USSR			Anniversaries		
Soyuz 9	(12%)	8%	U.S.-Japanese Treaty	(2%)	17%
China	(6%)	6%	Extended		
Indochina	(7%)	6%	Domestic Issues	(21%)	11%
Warsaw Treaty Foreign	(--)	6%	Indochina	(48%)	5%
Ministers' Budapest			Whealus Base	(0.06%)	3%
Meeting on European			Closing		
Secuurity			Sukarno's Death	(--)	1%
Yugoslav President	(--)	4%			
Ribicic in USSR					
Anniversary of Nazi	(3%)	5%			
Invasion of USSR					
Supreme Soviet Elections	(18%)	4%			
Middle East	(3%)	3%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

Initial Vietnamese communist reaction to President Nixon's 30 June report on the two-month U.S. operation in Cambodia comes on 1 July in a Hanoi radio commentary which says the report shows that the Administration is bent on pursuing its "aggression" despite "serious military defeats" throughout Indochina and political isolation. Hanoi and Front comment on the eve of the final troop withdrawal from Cambodia cited the continuing U.S. air strikes and the ARVN presence as evidence of aggression and went so far as to charge that U.S. troops may be sent back in.

Moscow reacts typically with a brief TASS dispatch on the 30th describing the President's report as an effort to justify the United States' "invasion." Noting that the President said he seeks a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, TASS interjects the remark that "despite rumors" he failed to announce the appointment of a high-level representative at the Paris talks.

The day before the President's report was made public, VNA released a communique from the "Defense Ministry" in Sihanouk's government rounding up alleged feats of the Cambodian "patriots" during the past three months, including attacks on 12 out of 19 provincial capitals and the complete "liberation" of four of them. A Sihanouk statement publicized on the 30th claims that "many" provinces are now totally controlled and lists five. Earlier references to the cutting off of Phnom Penh are repeated, and Liberation Radio on the 26th says the Lon Nol-Matak regime is worried about the prospect of an attack on the capital.

Sihanouk concluded his state visit to North Korea on 1 July after having participated in the events marking the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. Chinese speakers at the anniversary observances repeated the implicit criticism of Soviet policy expressed in Peking's 25 June joint editorial-- "certain persons" are even "maintaining dirty relations with Lon Nol and his like." Moscow has ignored the Chinese attack, but routine Soviet comment continues to score the PRC for blocking joint communist action on Indochina.

PRESIDENT'S 30 JUNE REPORT, CAMBODIAN POLICY SCORED

HANOI AND THE FRONT The 1 July Hanoi radio commentary on President Nixon's report on the U.S. operation in Cambodia says the President continued to "boast" of victories and released statistics on "booty seized from the enemy." But it glosses over the fact that the targets were

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 2 -

Vietnamese communist sanctuaries and speaks only of "aggression" against Cambodia. A 29 June Hanoi radio commentary discussing the U.S. withdrawal mentions the objective of "capturing the communist command staff on Cambodian territory and launching search-and-destroy missions," but it implies that the communists are Cambodian and makes no reference to any Vietnamese role.*

Hanoi's comment on the President's report echoes earlier propaganda in seeing evidence of continued U.S. "aggression" in the fact that U.S. air strikes will continue, that ARVN forces will remain in Cambodia, and that other "mercenaries" will be sent. Comment prior to the release of the report had charged that the President plans to return U.S. troops to Cambodia after their withdrawal at the end of June. Most notably, a 25 June NHAN DAN article, publicized by Hanoi radio and VNA, calls attention to the 22 June Pentagon acknowledgment of U.S. air strikes in Cambodia beyond the 21-mile limit for U.S. ground operations and cites press reports that U.S. planes are flying combat-support missions in Cambodia and that B-52's are being used there.

The paper claims that the decision to expand the air raids was taken to shore up the Lon Nol regime and Saigon forces in the face of the U.S. withdrawal, as well as to "maintain the presence of direct U.S. military action in that country in order to provide for a later return of U.S. troops." The article says that the "punishment" of U.S. "aggressors" in Vietnam was used as an excuse to invade Cambodia and that "if U.S. pilots are killed in Cambodia, Nixon will not hesitate

* Hanoi and Front propaganda has been inconsistent regarding the Vietnamese communist presence in Cambodia. The 2 May DRV Government statement on the President's 30 April speech referred only to his "slanders" against the DRV, while the PRG statement on the same occasion said the President "slanderosly accused the DRV and PRG of waging aggression against Cambodia." Some comment following the President's 3 June TV speech acknowledged his reference to Vietnamese communist sanctuaries, with some items going so far as to ridicule his failure on that occasion to mention the objective of "razing VC headquarters"--for example, Hanoi radio on the 4th, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 5th, and NHAN DAN on the 12th. A NHAN DAN commentary on the 5th said that the President's real aim was to save the Lon Nol regime from collapse. See the TRENDS of 10 June, pages 1-2.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 3 -

to use the piratic right to act freely." NHAN DAN buttresses this judgment by citing a comment in the 1 June issue of U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT to the effect that "in November and December when the rainy season ends, President Nixon again must decide whether to return U.S. troops to Cambodia."

A 28 June Liberation Radio commentary also raises the question of the return of U.S. troops to Cambodia and, like NHAN DAN, quotes U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT as saying that the President must decide in November and December about sending U.S. troops back across the border. The commentary goes on to claim that the allies have sustained "bitter setbacks" in Cambodia and that the "Lon Nol clique" is doomed. "The Cambodian people's patriotic forces," it says, "have developed by leaps and bounds, liberating half the country and directing their guns at Phnom Penh."

Sharp attacks on the President appear in the 29 June Hanoi radio commentary and in a NHAN DAN article the same day pegged to the Senate vote to repeal the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Glossing over the fact that it was pro-Administration Senators who moved to bring the resolution to a vote now, NHAN DAN says the vote "is indicative of the bitter dispute in the U.S. ruling class as a result of heavy U.S. defeats in Indochina" and of strong pressure from the antiwar forces. The article adds that by the Cambodian action, "Nixon has further cast slurs on U.S. honor . . . and has appeared in his true colors as an international gendarme, a callous warmonger who during the Eisenhower Administration urged the dispatch of U.S. troops to Vietnam. He now becomes the most protested and most hated President in U.S. history."

The radio commentary cites a French paper as having said that on 30 June the President would be either a vanquished man or a liar and sets out to demonstrate that he is both, having "failed" in his mission in Cambodia and still pursuing aggression against that country.

MOSCOW The initial brief TASS report on the President's Cambodia report cites an AP correspondent for the observation that the report contained no surprises but was the most elaborate explanation to date of the Cambodian move. It goes on to note that the U.S. air strikes will continue and that aid to Lon Nol will be increased. Another TASS report a few hours later repeats this and adds that the ARVN will

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 4 -

continue its operations. Both reports note the President's support for a political settlement but observe that he said nothing about appointing a new U.S. delegation head at Paris and that he "repeated threats to the South Vietnamese patriots." It is in a commentary in English to the United Kingdom that Moscow broaches the question of the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia: The President "tried to whitewash American actions when he claimed, contrary to the facts, that aggression against Cambodia was unleashed not by the United States but by North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front."

Routine Moscow propaganda during the week stressed that a withdrawal of U.S. ground forces on the 30th would not mean the end of U.S. action in Cambodia, and there are continuing references to the "admissions" by Pentagon spokesmen, Secretary Laird, and Secretary Rogers that U.S. air strikes will continue throughout the country, that the Saigon troops will remain, and that Thai troops will be sent in. A domestic service commentary on the 27th ridicules the background briefings of journalists by the President and his advisors in San Clemente, calling them part of an "advertising campaign" to coax the press into presenting Administration policy on Indochina in a favorable light. The commentary notes that representatives of the New York TIMES and the Washington POST, among others, were excluded from the briefing because, "not wanting to lose subscribers," they have opposed the incursion into Cambodia.

Secretary Rogers' remarks at his Washington press conference as well as in California are cited as evidence of U.S. intent to pursue "aggression" in Cambodia. And a domestic service commentary by Moscow radio's military analyst Col. Aleksey Leontyev on the 28th says Rogers' Asian trip and his participation in the SEATO meeting in Manila will be used to seek cannonfodder in pursuit of the President's Guam Doctrine of "letting Asians fight Asians." Leontyev points to the likely dispatch of Thai troops, and a brief Washington-dated TASS dispatch on the 30th says that Rogers, addressing the National Conference of Editors and Broadcasters in San Francisco the day before, made the first flat statement by a high-ranking U.S. official that Thai troops will wage combat operations in Cambodia together with Saigon forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 5 -

SIHANOUK STATEMENT A statement issued by Sihanouk in Pyongyang on 30 June, covered in DPRK, DRV, and PRC media, denounces the U.S. "deception" of a troop withdrawal and terms the President's decision to withdraw all American ground forces from Cambodia by 1 July "a machiavellian maneuver by an ambitious politician" to dupe the electorate. Withdrawal, it says, will not efface the "crimes" of the U.S. troops in Cambodia, and in any case "Thieu-Ky" troops will continue to "occupy" Cambodian territory. Moreover, it charges, an "invasion" by Thai forces will no doubt compensate for the withdrawal of American troops.

The statement says that although President Nixon promised the American people "a rapid end" of the Indochina war, his aggression in Cambodia has only prolonged it, with the United States suffering "shameful defeats." It cites Senator Mansfield as "confirming" this view and as stating that the "sanctuaries of the patriots" are "multiplying" and that "more than half" the country has been liberated.

COMMUNIST CLAIMS OF MILITARY SUCCESS IN CAMBODIA

COMMUNIQUE FROM "DEFENSE MINISTRY" VNA on 29 June carried a 20 June communique on communist feats in Cambodia during the past three months, issued by the Defense Ministry of the Royal Government of National Union and distributed by the information bureau of the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK).

The communique claims that the "Cambodian national liberation armed forces" and people have annihilated or captured 25,000 soldiers of the Lon Nol army and that 20,000 more government troops have disbanded. It further claims that in combat from 1 May to 20 June they have eliminated nearly 20,000 U.S. and ARVN troops, including nearly 10,000 GI's; shot down nearly 300 planes; destroyed 1,400 military vehicles, 150 artillery pieces and mortars, and 15 war vessels; captured or destroyed thousands of tons of ammunition, food, and other military supplies; and attacked five of the six corps area headquarters.

The communique alleges that the forces have attacked 12 of the 19 provincial capitals, completely "liberating" four of them, and have liberated many townships, district capitals, and hundreds of villages totalling more than one million

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 6 -

inhabitants, "which form a large liberated zone, solid rear bases of the resistance war." These victories, it says, "mark a big stride forward of the Cambodian revolution." Acclaiming the establishment of "the democratic power of the people" and a "patriotic people's army," the communique expresses the confidence of the armed forces in head of state and Front chairman Sihanouk and in Penn Nouth, chairman of the Front politburo and premier.

CURRENT ACTION VNA claimed on 27 June that the Cambodian National Liberation Army (CLNA) had forced the withdrawal of government forces from Thbeng Meanchey, the capital of Preah Vihear Province, on the 20th and that three districts in the province have been "liberated" along with the provincial capital. Feats in Preah Vihear Province are also cited in a 28 June VNA commentary on President Thieu's 27 June speech, which dealt with Cambodian policy. The commentator says further that AFP on the 27th reported the complete liberation of the four northern provinces of Ratanakiri, Mondulhiri, Stung Treng, and Kratie. (Sihanouk's 30 June statement adds Preah Vihear to this list.) The commentary cites an unidentified Western press dispatch dated 14 June for the report that half the country is under the control of the "Cambodian patriotic forces," that all the main roads to Phnom Penh are interdicted, and that the railroad to "Sihanouk port" has been mined and cut. On the 26th, Liberation Radio asserted that Phnom Penh was isolated and that "Lon Nol and Matak have been very much worried about the prospect that Phnom Penh may be attacked."

ANGKOR WAT On 25 June NCNA publicized two statements by Sihanouk's government on the temples of Angkor. The first, dated 23 June, declares that the "national liberation armed forces," in conformity with Sihanouk's instructions, are protecting the relics of Angkor from pillage or use for military purposes. It charges that allied forces have caused the destruction of religious buildings and other property elsewhere in Cambodia and that air bombing and artillery bombardment by allied forces in the vicinity of the temples of Angkor "already constitute a grave menace of destruction of these Khmer historical relics." The statement appeals for the support of world opinion, but adds that "the Royal Government of National Union wishes to make it clear that it rejects the right of any third country and any international organization to interfere in Cambodia under the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 7 -

deceptive pretext of protecting Cambodia's historical relics." The second statement, dated 24 June, refutes an AP report that forces of the liberation army are entrenched in the Angkor temples.

VNA reported the two statements on 27 and 28 June. Hanoi and Pathet Lao media had earlier denied news reports that Vietnamese communist troops, including Pathet Lao and Chinese elements, were quartered in the temple complex.*

Allied "encroachment" on the Angkor temple area is also scored in a statement by the FUNK information bureau--publicized by Hanoi on the 29th--which charges that the allies bombed the Udong temple area, the old capital of the kingdom of Cambodia, on 26 June.

PARIS TALKS: ROUTINE CLAIMS, CHARGES AT 25 JUNE SESSION

Vietnamese communist media again give cursory and inconsistent accounts of the 72d session of the Paris talks on 25 June. Thus LPA, but not VNA, in reporting PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien's statement notes his remark that President Nixon's pledge to withdraw U.S. troops from Cambodia by 30 June is "simply a maneuver to cover up" a U.S. scheme to expand and prolong the war. VNA similarly fails to report DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's comments on the President's withdrawal pledge, but both accounts note Tien's assertion that the United States has ordered the indefinite occupation of Cambodia by South Vietnamese forces, is making preparations to dispatch Thai "mercenaries" there, and is planning to continue to provide air and logistical support for GVN forces.

The VNA account of DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's statement reflects his attack on U.S. delegate Habib's argument at the last session that President Nixon's 20 April address was "an invitation to negotiate" and showed a "flexible attitude." VNA notes that in rebuttal Vy said the Administration still insists on a mutual withdrawal and tries to maintain the Saigon administration and that he cited U.S. aggressive acts

* See the TRENDS of 17 June, page 6, and 24 June, page 2.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 8 -

which, he charged, belie the U.S. delegate's claim of a flexible attitude. The account records Vy's charge that the Nixon Administration "persistently opposed" the NFLSV's 10-point program, gave priority to Vietnamization, and at the same time "downgraded the importance of and thereby sabotaged" the Paris talks. On the other hand, neither the VNA nor the LPA account acknowledges Tien's remark casting doubt on allied intentions or his pro forma reassertion that the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution is "the honorable and safe way out of South Vietnam" for the United States.

Both the VNA and LPA accounts indicate that Tien devoted the major part of his statement to describing the "abominable crimes" committed in the GVN's pacification program, but they do not mention in this regard that Tien pegged his remarks to a recent statement by GVN President Thieu to the effect that a "special pacification program" will be initiated in South Vietnam effective 1 July. Tien's typically graphic description of alleged GVN and allied crimes and atrocities, as well as of the PLAF "victories," are partially noted in the accounts.

Where the VNA accounts of the sessions on the 11th and 18th had not given any description of the allied delegates' statements, the account of the 25 June session reverts to the practice of at least identifying the delegates and giving a one-sentence description of their remarks. Thus VNA, totally obscuring the substance of Lam's address, says that he "again resorted to perfidious allegations in an attempt to deceive world public opinion, which is condemning the United States for expanding the war to the whole of Indochina and the Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration for serving as a tool of the U.S. aggression." As for Habib, VNA says he "repeated his absurd proposal on 'mutual troop withdrawal' and stubbornly rejected the South Vietnamese people's just demand that the United States withdraw unconditionally its troops from South Vietnam and cast off the Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration."

With no explanation of the context, VNA says at the end of its account that in their supplementary speeches Tien and Vy "stressed that the so-called Djakarta conference on Indochina had been in fact wirepulled by the United States with the aim of covering up and justifying the U.S. aggressive acts against the Indochinese peoples."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 9 -

SIHANOUK CONCLUDES STATE VISIT TO NORTH KOREA

Continuing his state visit to North Korea, Sihanouk took part in the events marking the 20th anniversary of the Korean War. He addressed the 25 June Pyongyang city rally and attended several anniversary banquets. On the 27th, Sihanouk hosted a banquet in honor of Kim Il-song at which both leaders spoke and which was attended by the PRC, DRV, PRG, and Pathet Lao delegations that were in Pyongyang for the anniversary. Kim Il-song hosted a dinner for Sihanouk on the 30th, and Sihanouk left the DPRK on 1 July; he was seen off at the railroad station by Kim Il-song in a farewell ceremony at which both leaders spoke. KCNA reported on 30 June that a DPRK-Cambodian joint statement was signed, but a text is not yet available.

In his 27 June banquet speech, according to KCNA, Sihanouk once again warmly thanked the DPRK for its support, recalling that at a 15 June banquet Kim Il-song had promised "active support by all necessary means" and that President Choe Yong-kon had repeated the promise at a rally on the 18th. Sihanouk added that the Khmers are also grateful for the support of the PRC, Vietnam, and Laos and that the American imperialists cannot destroy "this anti-U.S. joint front of the revolutionary peoples of Asia." In a similar vein, Kim Il-song said Sihanouk's visit had "consolidated the friendship and solidarity between our peoples on a new basis and cemented still further the anti-U.S. common front covering a vast region from Korea to China, Vietnam, Laos, and popular and anti-imperialist Cambodia." He again promised the Cambodians continued moral and material "active assistance."

MINISTERS OF SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT IN USSR, UAR

TASS reported on 26 June that "representatives of the Soviet public" met with FUNK Political Bureau members Thiounn Mumm and Chea San.* The report was printed in PRAVDA and carried in the domestic service the next day. This report gives no

* Paris AFP had reported on the 24th that Thiounn Mumm arrived in Moscow that day for a week-long visit, after which he will visit Warsaw and other East European capitals.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 10 -

other titles for the guests, but a brief TASS item on the 29th, in reporting that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin received Thiounn Mumm, acknowledges that he is "minister of economy and finance of the Royal National Unity Government." This is the first explicit reference to the Sihanouk government noted in Moscow propaganda since 6 May, when TASS briefly reported the proclamation of Sihanouk's government and the FUNK political program. Thus far, Soviet propaganda has not mentioned that Chea San is the Sihanouk government's ambassador to Moscow as well as its minister of justice.

TASS does not indicate the substance of any talks with Firyubin but does note that at the meeting with the public on the 26th the deputy chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee expressed "sympathy" for the "just struggle of the Cambodian patriots."

NCNA on 25 June reported the arrival in Cairo the day before of the foreign minister of the Royal Government of National Union, Sarin Chhak, who recently visited India and Ceylon. The Cairo MENA on the 25th quoted him as claiming that 20 countries have now recognized the new government, adding to the list "Palestine"--presumably the Palestine Liberation Organization. On 30 June MENA reported that foreign minister Sarin Chhak said he will act concurrently as ambassador to Cairo until a new ambassador is named. Ambassadors of Sihanouk's government have thus far been accredited in the DRV, DPRK, and PRC.

DJAKARTA CONFERENCE MISSION'S MOSCOW VISIT NOTED BY USSR, PRC

The first known Soviet acknowledgment of the 17 June Moscow visit of the Djakarta Conference three-nation mission* comes on the 28th in an IZVESTIYA article which says that despite the negative Soviet attitude toward the Djakarta Conference,

* On 24 June the Djakarta domestic service reported that the three-nation mission arrived in Warsaw and met the same day with Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski. From Warsaw, according to the report, the group is to go on to London. Warsaw media are not known to have mentioned the mission's visit.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 11 -

newspapers in "a number of Asian countries" have come up with various conjectures in connection with the visit. IZVESTIYA says that the three representatives--from Indonesia, Japan, and Malaysia--were "received precisely as the representatives of those countries with which the Soviet Union maintains normal diplomatic relations." The paper says nothing about either an international conference or the role of the ICC when it states that the Soviet attitude toward U.S. intervention in Cambodia is "well known," having been set out in the 4 May Soviet Government statement. The paper reiterates the position that the "only way" to restore peace in Cambodia and Indochina is to "swiftly and unconditionally" withdraw U.S. and allied troops and grant the Indochinese people the opportunity to decide their own destiny.

PEKING Peking attacks the group's talks with Gromyko in a 25 June NCNA commentary pegged to the recent meeting of the ASPAC Council in Wellington, New Zealand. It notes that the ASPAC communique lauded the "sinister" Djakarta conference which is designed to put out the flames of revolution in Indochina, and it says that the Japanese and Malaysian delegates reported to the meeting on their "talks on the convening of a new Geneva conference" with the Soviet foreign minister. There is no further reference to the Soviet Union; the commentary goes on merely to score Japan for its role in the Djakarta conference.

TIRANA The visits of U Thant and the three-nation Djakarta mission to Moscow are cited in a ZERI I POPULLIT article--carried by Tirana's ATA on 24 June--which denounces U.S. "maneuvers" to achieve peace in Indochina, allegedly carried out with the assistance of the "Moscow revisionists." (Moscow's reports of U Thant's 17-21 June visit said little about Indochina and avoided the issue of a political settlement. Peking is not known to have commented on Thant's Moscow visit, but it did pick up LPA and VNA commentaries denouncing his 11 June call for an international conference on Indochina.)

ZERI I POPULLIT acknowledges U Thant's reported statement in Moscow that his attitude and that of the USSR on Cambodia "coincide almost completely." The article asserts that during the talks in Moscow new "maneuvers" were made to induce the Indochinese people to "lay down their arms and accept humiliating capitulation during talks in some international forum (UN, Geneva conference on Indochina, etc.)." The article says that the presence in Moscow of the Djakarta three-nation mission at the same time was part of a "previously

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 12 -

coordinated plan" and that the three representatives, "common friends of Washington and Moscow," were able to coordinate their counterrevolutionary plans in Asia.

MOSCOW CONTINUES POLEMIC ON PEKING'S INDOCHINA STAND

Moscow's continuing attack on Peking's Indochina policies included a 28 June Mandarin-language broadcast recalling obstruction of aid to Vietnam. It says that railway cars were sometimes delayed for several months and that "Soviet transport planes were not permitted to fly over Chinese territory."

A 27 June broadcast in Mandarin for the PLA says that when the situation in Indochina "becomes so serious as to require united action," the Chinese talk about a "threat from the North" and intensify their anti-Soviet propaganda. As a result, says the commentary, the United States has spread aggression to Cambodia, resumed some bombing of the DRV, and continues "special warfare" in Laos. A Mandarin-language commentary on the 20th similarly charges the "false revolutionaries" in China with encouraging U.S. aggression. Although events in Indochina, "which is adjacent to southern China," do "affect China's security to a certain extent," the commentary says, the Chinese leaders merely "talk big but never take concrete action"; and the 20 May Mao statement that "a small nation can defeat a big" merely shows that China wants to allow the small nations to shoulder the responsibility of war. The commentary also cites Kuo Mo-jo as having said at a reception marking the PRG anniversary that "the war in Indochina is the affair of the peoples of the three nations."*

DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DELEGATION STOPS IN PRC, USSR

VNA and Hanoi radio reported on 29 June that the DRV National Assembly delegation headed by Standing Committee Vice Chairman Hoang Van Hoan had arrived in Peking on the 23d

* NCNA quoted Kuo Mo-jo, at a friendship association reception, as expressing the PRC's conviction that the Indochinese peoples can win their protracted war, but as adding that the Chinese people "have always regarded the Vietnamese people's struggle as their own" and give them "firm support."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 13 -

"for a stopover" on its way to East Europe. This is Hanoi media's first mention of the delegation since the visit was announced on 23 June and a NHAN DAN editorial the next day pointed to its "significance." The 29 June reports noted that the delegates were welcomed at the airport by Li Hsien-nien, vice premier of the State Council, who gave a banquet later in the day in their honor. Hanoi said the delegates also attended the grand meeting marking the 20th anniversary of the Korean War and were guests of honor at a reception given by Chou En-lai for the DPRK delegation visiting Peking for the anniversary. Both items reported that the delegation left Peking on the 27th, but only VNA mentioned that their destination was Moscow.

NCNA had reported the delegation's departure on the 27th, noting that it had been in Peking since 23 June. Also on the 27th, TASS reported that the delegation had arrived in Moscow, "en route to Sofia," and was met at the airport by chairman of the USSR parliamentary group Ivan Spiridonov and other officials.

On the 30th Moscow reported that the delegation had left by air for Sofia. Moscow radio's domestic service noted that the group was seen off by Spiridonov and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Firyubin. Hanoi media have not mentioned the delegation's arrival or departure from Moscow to date and have given no additional information on its itinerary.

FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN DENOUNCES U.S. ATTACKS ON DRV

DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements issued on 27 and 30 June charge the United States with bombing DRV territory on the 25th and 26th, respectively. The 30 June statement claims that U.S. aircraft on the 26th bombed Huong Lap village while U.S. artillery south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) shelled Vinh Son village--both targets being located in the northern part of the DMZ. The spokesman routinely denounces the "crimes" and demands the cessation of all U.S. encroachments on the DRV.

The 25 June attack by U.S. aircraft "on a place in Dien Chau district, Nghe An Province," is "severely condemned" in the statement of 27 June. This statement also routinely condemns the continued violation of DRV airspace by U.S. aircraft. The VNA account of the statement says that the spokesman "flatly rejected the argument about the so-called 'protective reaction' resorted to by the U

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 14 -

command to justify the U.S. piratical acts."* Claiming that these "acts of war" are a "flagrant encroachment" on DRV sovereignty and security, the spokesman demanded that the United States "stop those acts at once."

Hanoi claims the downing of an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane over Quang Ninh Province on 1 July, bringing its total of downed American planes to 3,353. The last previous downing of a U.S. plane was said to have been on 31 May over Ha Tinh Province.

INSTRUCTIONS ON ATTACKING VIETNAM DISTRICT CAPITALS

Liberation Radio broadcast in three daily installments from 23 through 25 June an "unsigned commentary" explaining the importance to the allies of district capitals and military subsectors and detailing instructions on how to attack them. The article explains that the allies use the capitals and subsectors as bases for consolidating the armed forces and administration at the basic level, for oppressing the people, harrasing the revolutionary movement, and strengthening the defense of areas adjacent to the cities. To counter these schemes, the article says, "we must rush forward in the flush of successes to continue to attack many more district capitals and military subsectors so as to efficiently assist the masses in rising up to gain control, to liberate each rural area, and to consolidate and vigorously develop our offensive position"

* The U.S. command in Saigon on the 26th had reported that an American bomber hit an anti-aircraft installation in North Vietnam in response to "hostile actions" against U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. The command said that such raids constitute "protective reaction" and are an inherent right of self-defense.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 15 -

The article acknowledges that the allies "enjoy many advantages" in the capitals and subsectors, saying that they are numerically strong, are surrounded by a security system, can quickly deploy troops in the area, have strong permanent fortifications, and are supported by strong artillery firepower and motorized reinforcements. By contrast, it cites as allied weakpoints only the low morale and "complex composition" of allied forces, gaps in the allied defense caused by the large size of the capital or subsector, and the people's "hatred" of the "enemy." Later the article notes that since attacks on district capitals and military subsectors sometimes involve "intense" and drawn-out fighting, it is important to forge and maintain a high level of determination.

The article offers statistics on the number of district capitals and military subsectors attacked since the start of the 1968 Tet offensive, in some cases listing the names of specific targets. It claims that prolonged attacks as well as brief ones have been carried out, citing cases of attacks lasting more than 60 and 90 days.

The article stresses the use of regional armed forces as the core for such attacks. Regional units, along with guerrilla forces, are credited with most of the successes in past attacks; and in spelling out correct methods to be used, the article pointedly contrasts the advantages of regional forces over main force units. In a passage which could reflect limitations on the effectiveness of troops from the DRV, the article states that the regional armed forces "are closely bound to their native places" and have an advantage "over forces coming from far away."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FEIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 16 -

KOREAN WAR ANNIVERSARY

FANFARE FROM PEKING AND PYONGYANG, ROUTINE MOSCOW OBSERVANCE

LEVEL AND NATURE OF CELEBRATIONS The 20th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War has been celebrated with propaganda fanfare in Pyongyang and Peking, while Moscow marked the event in routine fashion.* Pyongyang opened its propaganda barrage with the release of a lengthy government memorandum, followed by publicity for a Pyongyang city rally attended by Premier Kim Il-song and addressed by First Vice Premier Kim Il. Foreign speakers at the rally, in addition to Prince Sihanouk, included delegates from the PRC, DRV, South Vietnam's PRG, and the Pathet Lao. These delegations were all received by Kim Il-song for "friendly talks," were entertained at a DPRK Cabinet banquet attended by Kim Il-song, and jointly hosted a banquet for Kim in return.

The high level of the observance in Pyongyang is in keeping with treatment of a decennial anniversary. Kim Il-song does not normally appear at the annual observances but attended the rally on the 10th anniversary. There is no known precedent for the appearance of the foreign delegations in Pyongyang.

Peking's effusive treatment of the anniversary seems in keeping with the recent warming of Sino-Korean relations and with Peking's initiative in backing Sihanouk and the Cambodian "revolution." In the past three years Peking had either totally ignored the occasion or acknowledged it only cursorily in brief NCNA reports. Peking's last normal observance of the anniversary was in 1966, before Sino-Korean relations began to deteriorate seriously; the occasion was marked with the usual Peking rally and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial that year.

This year for the first time the Chinese directly linked commemoration of the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June with observance of the anniversary of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan--dated 27 June by Peking, recalling the U.S. Seventh

* Propaganda on the anniversary will be reviewed in greater detail in a Supplement to the TRENDS under separate cover. Treatment of the Taiwan question in anniversary propaganda is discussed in the Sino-U.S. Relations section of this issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 17 -

Fleet's interdiction of military actions involving Taiwan by either the Chinese communists or the Nationalists. The two anniversaries, both ignored from 1967 through 1969, had been commemorated separately by Peking in the past. Pyongyang this year followed its customary practice of celebrating a "day of struggle for the withdrawal of the United States from South Korea" on 25 June, marking the Taiwan anniversary with separate observances including a rally on the 27th and a NODONG SINMUN editorial the same day expressing support for the PRC's claim to Taiwan.

DPRK Foreign Minister Pa Song-chol went to Peking to take part in the anniversary ceremonies there. A lower-ranking Korean group had gone to Peking for the 15th anniversary. Pak was received by Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao and greeted with a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. He addressed a Peking rally along with PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and was entertained at a banquet by Chou En-lai. He also visited Shanghai and the deputy head of the DPRK delegation went to Shenyang, both being feted by revolutionary committee chairmen. Many of China's provinces also held local rallies.

Moscow marked the Korean War anniversary with the usual rally in the capital addressed by the chairman of the USSR-DPRK friendship society and by the deputy chairman of the DPRK-USSR friendship society, who is currently leading a visiting delegation. The Soviet press and radio have carried the customary routine-level comment.

KOREAN COMMENT The content of Pyongyang's propaganda on the Korean War anniversary is routine in substance.

The DPRK Government memorandum and the other speeches and propaganda from Pyongyang are replete with the usual militant formulations blaming the United States for maneuvering to provoke a "new war," reiterating North Korea's determination to defend itself, and recalling the "lessons" of the Korean War. At the same time, the propaganda reaffirms North Korea's dedication to the notion of "peaceful" unification, and the government memorandum reviews Pyongyang's frequently repeated proposals in this regard. The propaganda also praises the South Korean "anti-U.S. national salvation struggle," and the usual "appeal to the South Korean people," calling on them to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 18 -

drive out the Americans and overthrow the Pak Chong-hui "clique," was adopted at the Pyongyang rally. There are some references to the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist party in the South, which Pyongyang had announced on 20 June.

Pyongyang balances its thanks for Chinese support and the dispatch of volunteers to fight in the war with thanks to the USSR and other socialist countries for their aid and support. Pyongyang avoids anti-Soviet remarks on its own authority, although it duly reports polemical remarks by Chinese spokesmen.

Throughout, North Korean as well as Chinese propaganda extolls the "anti-imperialist united front of the revolutionary Asian people" encompassing the PRC, DPRK, DRV, PRG, Pathet Lao, and "liberated" Cambodia--a theme that has become increasingly prominent in Pyongyang's propaganda, as in Peking's, since the overthrow of Sihanouk and especially since Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement on the Indochina situation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 19 -

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

Peking has used the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War and the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan to reaffirm its determination to recover Taiwan and to put on record its first comment on the Warsaw talks since the meetings were resumed this year. While the Chinese have used tough language to charge the United States with persisting hostility, they have not exhibited a strong sense of urgency in pledging the "liberation" of Taiwan and, most notably, have again expressed their interest in basing PRC-U.S. relations on the five principles of coexistence. At the same time, the Chinese have taken the occasion to reassert the primacy of the Taiwan issue as the crucial obstacle to improved relations with the United States.

PRC DECRIES U.S. "OCCUPATION" OF TAIWAN ON ANNIVERSARY

Chinese comment during observances jointly marking the Korean and Taiwan anniversaries* followed routine lines in pledging the liberation of Taiwan and denouncing the United States for its alleged intrusions into PRC territory and its support of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. It was in comment on the Taiwan anniversary alone that Peking addressed itself directly to Sino-U.S. bilateral issues. In addition to low-level NCNA reports and commentaries in the domestic media, authoritative comment was made by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, a Politburo member, who addressed a rally in Pyongyang on 27 June devoted to the Taiwan anniversary. Citing the Warsaw talks, Huang declared that relaxation of Sino-U.S. relations is "out of the question" in light of the U.S. refusal to withdraw its troops from Taiwan and to "cease interference in China's internal affairs." Since the United States "persists in making itself the enemy" of the Chinese, he asserted, the PRC has "no choice but to resolve to deal with it accordingly to the end." He added that Taiwan "will certainly be liberated."

* Peking dates the outbreak of the Korean War as 25 June and the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan as 27 June 1950.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 20 -

Two NCNA reports sought to document Peking's charges of U.S. hostility. On the 27th NCNA recounted the series of "serious warnings" against U.S. intrusions into PRC territory and likened President Nixon to his predecessors since Truman as "jackals of the same lair" who have "not in the least" changed the U.S. policy of "aggression toward China." An NCNA correspondent's report on the 26th, claiming in a similar vein that the Nixon Administration has persisted in traditional U.S. policies of "forcible occupation of Taiwan and hostility to China," took exception to visits to Taiwan by Vice President Agnew and Secretary Rogers and their reaffirmation of U.S. treaty commitments to the Nationalist regime. Like Huang, NCNA brought up the question of relaxation of PRC-U.S. tensions, dismissing the President's call for improving relations as "nothing but a trick" to deceive public opinion. In an unusual allusion to agitation in the United States for a conciliatory line toward Peking, the report claimed that the "bankrupt anti-China policy" has become "even more unpopular" and that this induced the President to assume a more flexible stance.

Peking's tough approach at the time of the anniversary comports with its practice of using milestone occasions to restate a strong case against an adversary and to enhance its image of "principled" revolutionary militance. Thus Peking's joint editorial on the 22 April Lenin centenary blasted Soviet positions across the board, though shortly afterwards the Chinese signalled their intent to persist in the Sino-Soviet talks and began an extended period of polemical restraint toward the Soviets. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the Taiwan anniversary are such as to reinforce Peking's urge to stake out a hard bargaining position. Peking's current campaign playing on themes of Asian revolutionary unity against the U.S. presence, including efforts to associate the PRC's claim on Taiwan with North Korean and North Vietnamese aspirations to reunify their countries, dictates a tough stance toward the United States; at the same time, the Chinese are being taunted by Moscow for failing to match their anti-imperialist pretensions with actions to recover Taiwan and Hong Kong. And as its announcements regarding the postponed session of the Warsaw talks scheduled for 20 May indicated, Peking finds it expedient to defer negotiations with Washington during a time of broadened military activity in Cambodia.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 21 -

PEKING CALLS FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITH UNITED STATES

Peking's comment on Sino-U.S. relations contains two ideological cues which point to a more flexible stance in the long run than the harsh anti-U.S. rhetoric might suggest. In referring to the Warsaw talks, Huang Yung-sheng cited the two principles--that the United States must withdraw all its troops from Taiwan and that Sino-U.S. relations must be based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence--which had been formulated in the 26 November 1968 PRC Foreign Ministry statement proposing that the talks be resumed after the inauguration of the Nixon Administration. Introduction of the concept of peaceful coexistence in that statement represented a striking shift in Peking's longstanding polemical assault on the lines of Soviet-U.S. detente. Indicative of Peking's former position was Chen I's remark, in a speech at a Soviet embassy reception on 15 February 1965 marking the Sino-Soviet treaty anniversary, that peaceful coexistence with "U.S. imperialism" is "out of the question."

Huang's call for peaceful coexistence with the United States is the first since the November 1968 statement.* In the first Chinese comment on the Warsaw talks since they were resumed this year, he has reaffirmed a significant ideological shift and declared that what is "out of the question" is--in contrast to Chen I's formulation--relaxation of Sino-U.S. relations while the United States maintains its military presence on Taiwan. In defining this as the "crucial" issue in Sino-U.S. relations, Huang has echoed the earlier statement's insistence on the primacy of questions of principle in the negotiations. The November 1968 statement had been even more explicit in complaining that the United States has "kept on haggling over side issues" and in warning that the PRC "will never barter away principles." In the manner of Huang's remarks, the statement said "no

* A PEOPLE'S DAILY article on 18 May 1969, during a period in which Peking was taking a notably tough line toward the United States, derided the President for talking "loudly about so-called 'peaceful coexistence' and [playing] the trick of sham relaxation."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI: TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 22 -

result whatsoever" would come of the Warsaw talks unless the United States was willing to tackle issues of principle.*

Peking's comment has shown flexibility in another respect in a trend away from a portrayal of congruent and collusive Soviet and U.S. interests to contain China. This contrasts with the tough line taken by Peking on Sino-U.S. relations last year which was marked by a stress on themes of collusion between the PRC's major adversaries. Though the Chinese used the occasion of the Korean War anniversary this year to take several digs at the Soviets for their dealings with the United States and Japan, there has been no attempt to depict the international environment as being dominated by joint Soviet-U.S. efforts to "encircle" the PRC. It may be indicative that in his 27 June speech on the Taiwan question, in contrast to his 25 June speech at the Pyongyang rally on the Korean War anniversary, Huang avoided the anti-Soviet remarks that recurred through other speeches by the Chinese.

Peking's portrayal of an environment in which U.S. and Soviet interests diverge at significant points, combined with calls for peaceful coexistence both with the United States and with the Soviet Union (in the 7 October 1969 PRC statement announcing agreement to hold border talks), provides an ideological rationale for the Chinese to take the negotiating track and to seek to acquire leverage in the triangular power relationship. The manner in which Peking left the door open to renewing the Warsaw talks after the recent postponement reflects an appreciation of this situation.

ROUTINE CALLS FOR TAIWAN LIBERATION SHOW LITTLE URGENCY

The 20-year milestone in the "occupation" of Taiwan has not been accompanied by a sense of urgency in Peking's calls for "liberation." The only note of urgency was put in the

* Peking has not mentioned the specific measures and proposals by the United States to relax tensions. In a characteristic allusion, NCNA's account on 28 February of the President's foreign policy report to Congress charged that he talked "hypocritically about his desire to improve 'relations' with China," but the account did not cite the President's references to the Warsaw talks and to unilateral U.S. measures to normalize relations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 23 -

mouth of impatient youth, a Red Guard speaking at the 25 June Peking rally commemorating the anniversary. "We Red Guards," the youth proclaimed, "will not tolerate the protracted occupation" of Taiwan by the United States. Other statements on the anniversary routinely voiced a determination to take over Taiwan without indicating any limits of patience.

Pledges in leaders' speeches to liberate Taiwan were presented in the name of "the Chinese people," with one exception. Speaking at a rally in Shenyang on 27 June, Chen Hsi-lien, one of the military figures on the Politburo, declared that the PLA as well as the Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan. The PLA's mission in this cause was given explicit sanction when the Chinese last marked the occasion, in 1966. A LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial at that time termed the liberation of Taiwan the PLA's "sacred duty."

A rally held in Foochow on 27 June was attended by commanders of the PLA Fukien Front units--the troops standing opposite Taiwan. In the principal address, a provincial revolutionary committee official declared that the "Chinese people" are determined to liberate Taiwan. Alluding to the province's strategic location, the speaker said the Fukien people would build the southeastern coast into "an iron bastion" and would "wipe out all enemy intruders and drive U.S. imperialism out of Taiwan." NCNA's report on the rally said it was followed by a mammoth demonstration by troops, civilians, "and fully armed militiamen at the front line" of the coastal defense. There was no reference to a PLA role in liberating Taiwan.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 JULY 1970

- ph -

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

LOW-VOLUME SOVIET COMMENT ON SALT CONTINUES ATTACKS ON LAIRD

Moscow continues to treat the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in Vienna in a low volume of propaganda and to date has failed to acknowledge the return of the top U.S. negotiators to Washington for consultations on 22 June. Commentaries by Matveyev and Stolpovskiy, however, react to Secretary Laird's remarks at recent NATO meetings in Venice and Brussels on SALT and on the existence of a Soviet threat.

The Matveyev article, signed to the press on 17 June and appearing in LIFE ABROAD (No. 25, 19-25 June), sustains the Soviet attack against Laird as the chief opponent of a relaxation of tension. Matveyev expresses concern over a U.S. press report that Laird spoke at the NATO meetings of a time limit on the Vienna talks and said it is possible the United States "will have to take 'harsh and difficult decisions' about new strategic armaments after July 1972 or in the second half of 1973 should the Vienna talks break down." These are "strange" words, Matveyev says, since Secretary Rogers recently said the negotiations were continuing "in a normal and business-like atmosphere" and President Nixon had earlier expressed the conviction that the talks would culminate in an agreement. Matveyev charges that Laird is in effect "resorting to blackmail formulas" with his talk about a "'breakdown'" in the negotiations.

In an international review article in TRUD on the 16th, Stolpovskiy attacked Laird in a similar vein for playing up the "fable" of a Soviet threat and setting a "time limit" for the Vienna talks. Like Matveyev, Stolpovskiy emphasized the sincerity of the Soviet quest for disarmament.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI: TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 25 -

EUROPEAN SECURITY

PACT DOCUMENT BREAKS NEW GROUND ON CONFERENCE MAKEUP, AGENDA

The memorandum of the 21-22 June meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Budapest, released on the 26th, formalizes the bid for U.S. and Canadian participation in the proposed European security conference that had been anticipated by Moscow's public endorsement of American participation in January. The memorandum, which a communique on the meeting three days earlier had said would be "communicated to the governments of all interested states," also expands the agenda for the conference proposed by the Pact foreign ministers last October in Prague. Like the Prague declaration, the memorandum suggests Helsinki as the site for the conference.

U.S., CANADIAN
PARTICIPATION

The memorandum declares that every European state, the two Germanies included, as well as the United States and Canada can take part in the conference on a basis of equality. It also drops the previously standard reference to an "all-European" or "pan-European conference."

The Pact foreign ministers' declaration in October had seemed to leave the possibility of U.S. participation open, stating that the matter of participants could be solved with good will. Prior Pact documents had registered a long history of vacillation and ambiguity on the U.S. role. While some formulations seemed to exclude the United States, the Bucharest declaration of July 1966--following a Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting--asserted the Pact's readiness to take part in a conference at a time convenient "to the other interested states, both members of NATO and neutrals," and observed that "countries on other continents cannot be indifferent to how things develop in Europe."

The Soviet Union's own equivocation and ambivalence on the issue was finally resolved on 13 January 1970, when a foreign ministry spokesman said Moscow had informed Washington "of its favorable attitude to the participation of the United States in an all-European conference" and added that this view was shared by the other socialist states. Subsequent Soviet propaganda, however, only infrequently broached the possibility of U.S. participation. Followup comment on the 26 June memorandum now gives play to the invitation to the United States

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 26 -

and Canada, although at least two commentators--Mayevskiy and Podklyuchnikov in PRAVDA on 28 and 30 June, respectively--still use the terms "all-European" and "pan-European" in reference to the proposed conference.

AGENDA Endorsing the two-point agenda proposed at the October Prague meeting, renunciation of the use of force and the broadening of economic and other ties, the memorandum proposes that the second point be supplemented by discussion of problems of the human environment and the development of cultural relations. "Prompted by the desire to have every state agree on the agenda," the memorandum continues, the Pact member states now propose a third agenda item--discussion of "the establishment of a body concerned with questions of European security and cooperation." Brezhnev had hinted at the new item in his 12 June election speech when he stated, in discussing the European security conference proposal, that "the nations concerned could set up also some sort of a permanently functioning mechanism for the practical elaboration and implementation of concerted measures."

Brezhnev's remark seemed at the time to be responsive to a proposal advanced by the British at the 26-27 May NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Rome for creation of a permanent commission at the ambassadorial level for talks between NATO and Pact states. Participants in the 28 June domestic service roundtable now make a point of the differences between the memorandum's proposal and "the superficially similar proposal by Britain" at the Rome meeting. The British plan, they say, calls for a "bloc approach" which would allow only token representation from nonaligned European states, while the Pact is suggesting that "all European countries without exception take part in this organ." Moreover, the commentators add, the British plan calls for the creation of a mechanism before the conference is convened, seeking thereby to "postpone" the conference.

Concern to counter the appearance of direct Pact responsiveness to a NATO initiative seems reflected also in Soviet comment on the issue of mutual force cuts. The memorandum states that in the Pact members' view, "it would help to lessen tension and promote security in Europe if the reduction of foreign armed forces on the territory of European states were discussed," either in the newly proposed permanent body "or in other ways

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 27 -

acceptable to the states concerned." The NATO proposal for mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, long under fire from Moscow, is unmentioned in the memorandum but broached in followup propaganda. A panelist in the commentators' roundtable show on the 27th, remarking that the NATO meeting in Rome had urged that the question of a balanced force reduction "head" the work of a European conference, grants that the question is "important" but goes on to argue that it is connected with the "whole complex of disarmament" and is "beyond the framework of European security alone."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 28 -

MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW RESTRAINED ON NEW U.S. PEACE INITIATIVE

Moscow has responded cautiously to Secretary Rogers' 25 June press conference announcement of a U.S. political initiative to encourage the parties "to stop shooting and start talking" under the auspices of U Thant's representative, Ambassador Jarring. Limited Soviet comment cites Arab and West European press reaction in concluding that the proposals--which Rogers did not spell out in detail--contain nothing new when compared with the U.S. proposals of last December. Soviet propagandists make a point of professing no direct knowledge of the substance of the plan and do not acknowledge that Rogers said it had been presented to the USSR, among other countries.

U.S. ARMS TO ISRAEL In the 28 June domestic service commentators' round-table, one of the participants remarked that "our Arab colleagues are evidently informed about some of the points" in the U.S. proposal, but "so far those in the rest of the world can only guess at its content." One participant observed that Washington was experiencing pressure from American political leaders for stepped-up "interference on behalf of Israel" while at the same time open aid to Israel "angers a whole host of states" and makes this policy "risky." Another expressed hope that the new U.S. initiative is not merely a smokescreen to cover up supplies of "offensive weapons" to Israel. The fact that the United States "is preparing some kind of peaceful initiative" and at the same time saying that a new consignment of arms will be sold to Israel "rightly puts one on guard," he said, and "makes one regard talk about this new peaceful initiative with a certain amount of caution. Time alone will tell." Other Soviet comment suggests that the United States intends to continue material support to Israel, but from now on as "covertly as possible."

Promptly reporting the Secretary's press conference, TASS notes that he said U.S. policy with respect to Israel remains unchanged and that he declined to answer questions on further deliveries of U.S. military equipment to Israel, saying it would not be useful to publicly discuss military aid at this time.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 29 -

WITHDRAWAL Comment touching on the U.S. initiative continues to press for Israeli withdrawal from "all" occupied territories. Broadcasts in Arabic on the 25th and in English to North America on the 26th said that judging by Secretary Rogers' statement, Washington still objects to the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories, although this is the "main provision" of the November 1967 Security Council resolution. The latter broadcast also asserted that the Secretary "reduced the question of a political settlement" to a temporary cease-fire and tied a settlement to Arab-Israeli negotiations.

A Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on the 26th said one "looks in vain" for an answer to the "essential question" of whether the United States considers that the withdrawal of "all Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories" is necessary for reestablishing peace. As long as Washington delivers arms to Israel and does not "unequivocally announce" that the road to peace lies in an Israeli obligation for complete withdrawal, Tsoppi concluded, neither the Arabs nor international opinion will believe in the sincerity of U.S. intentions or its initiative. Citing Nasir on the subject of withdrawal, both TASS on the 26th and IZVESTIYA on the 28th reported that the UAR President in his 25 June speech in Benghazi, "speaking about the 'new American proposals,'" stressed that the Egyptian people would not agree to any bargaining over the question of Israeli withdrawal. (In the speech as broadcast live by Bayda radio, Nasir in fact did not specifically mention the U.S. initiative, referring only to "what has been reiterated today about agreements for evacuation from the occupied territories excluding the Golan.")

ARAB The Moscow Arabic-language commentary on the 25th
COMMENT declared that the first reaction to the Secretary's statement was one of "severe criticism" and that the Palestinian resistance organizations "rejected it completely." However, in reviewing Arab press comment on the 26th and 27th, TASS said merely that the papers note the "ambiguity of the statement" and cited Cairo press complaints that any proposals not envisaging the return of all occupied territories will not lead to the establishment of peace.

A Mayevskiy review in PRAVDA on the 28th attributed to the Arab press the view that the "backstage" U.S. proposals again put the aggressor and his victim on the same footing and signify attempts to weaken Arab anti-Americanism and to undermine Soviet-Arab

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 30 -

friendship, to justify arms deliveries to Israel, and to place responsibility for the continuation of the crisis on the Arabs and the Soviet Union.

NASIR ARRIVES IN MOSCOW FOR "FRIENDLY VISIT"

UAR President Nasir's unheralded arrival in Moscow on 29 June for a "friendly visit" is hailed in Soviet comment as an event of great significance for UAR-Soviet solidarity, cooperation, and "cordial relations." Reporting his arrival at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Soviet Government, TASS noted that Nasir "plans to stay in Moscow for several days."

Reporting the first session of the talks on the 30th, TASS listed Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Kosygin, Ponomarev, Gromyko, and Grechko among those present on the Soviet side and ASU Executive Committee member Ali Sabri, Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad, War Minister Fawzi, and National Guidance Minister Haykal among those on the UAR side. The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) noted on the 29th that Muhammad Riyad, minister at the UAR foreign ministry, would be arriving from New York to join the delegation. MENA said the talks would center on the Middle East problem, particularly developments resulting from Israel's "refusal to implement" the November 1967 Security Council resolution. The talks, MENA added, would also deal with the recent U.S. plan: The Soviet role in this respect "will be mainly to hear the UAR's views." TASS did not mention the U.S. initiative in reporting that the first day's talks, held "in an atmosphere of cordiality and complete mutual understanding," concerned bilateral relations as well as an "all-round exchange of views" on the Middle East situation and a discussion of "some other important problems" of the present international situation.

SPEECH BY Speaking at a 30 June banquet for Nasir, Podgornyy
PODGORNY called for settlement of the Middle East conflict on the basis of the November 1967 Security Council resolution, "with due account for the legitimate rights and interests of all peoples of the area," phraseology signifying

* Apart from his visit to the Soviet Union in January this year, never publicly acknowledged by either side, Nasir's last formal visit to Moscow was in early July 1968; he returned for medical treatment in Soviet Georgia from 26 July to 17 August that year.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 31 -

Israel's right to exist. He did not take the occasion to repeat the propaganda refrain that the resolution calls for Israeli withdrawal, although he went on to note that the "Israeli extremists" still occupy Arab territories and "drag out" a settlement.

Expressing conviction that a "just political settlement" will be achieved, Podgornyy cited as "guarantees" the "strengthening economic and defense potential" of the UAR and other Arab states, growing Arab unity, and the "aid and all-round support" of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. He pledged continued Soviet help to the Arab countries in their struggle "to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression" and attain a just and lasting peace, adding that there was "every ground to express satisfaction" over the friendly relations between the USSR and the UAR. Assessing the UAR's "progressive development," Podgornyy stated that "there are and possibly still will be obstacles," but these can be overcome "if the correct road of development" is chosen and if "one leans on sincere and reliable friends."

BILATERAL RELATIONS Soviet commentators predictably emphasize Soviet solidarity with the Arabs and assistance to the UAR. A Koryavin article in IZVESTIYA on the 29th points to economic projects which have become symbols of Soviet-Egyptian friendship, and a Tsoppi foreign-language commentary the same day stresses in addition the "anti-imperialist" content of the "political task" to which development is subordinated.

While Tsoppi notes only in passing that the UAR has "restored its defense potential," a 29 June commentary in Arabic focuses more on the improvements in Egyptian defense. The UAR, it says, has managed to rebuild its defense power quickly and "move to the stage of active defense." The commentary adds that Tel Aviv has been compelled to abandon its bombing of UAR positions in the rear and is being "appropriately repelled" in its attacks in the Suez Canal area: Soviet-UAR cooperation has helped make the UAR defense "invulnerable to the enemy" and a "new basic situation" has been created in which the anti-Arab forces have been forced to resort to "donning the garb of peace advocates."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 32 -

Perhaps the most explicit Soviet reference to the nature of Moscow's military assistance to the UAR is made by NOVOSTI political commentator Vadim Ardatovskiy, in an article printed in the Beirut DAILY STAR on 21 June but not carried in monitored Soviet media. Ardatovskiy says such assistance has consisted of "antiaircraft defense equipment and interceptor aircraft, both means of defense." With regard to the presence in the UAR of what Kosygin on 4 May called "our military advisers," the NOVOSTI commentator explains that if the technical level of the UAR and the Soviet Union is taken into account, "the presence of specialists to teach men how to handle the supplied means of defense is perfectly natural." Rejecting the possibility of an Arab-Israeli truce, Ardatovskiy declares that the "only thing possible is peace," the establishment of which would have a favorable effect on "the general complex of international relations and the relations between the great powers as well as between the Soviet Union and the United States."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 33 -

U. S. - JAPAN SECURITY TREATY

TREATY EXTENSION OCCASIONS NEW WARNINGS OF THREAT TO PEACE

The long-anticipated automatic extension of the U.S.-Japan security treaty at midnight 22 June drew renewed propaganda blasts against the treaty from Moscow and the Asian communist countries, with authoritative signed comment in the Soviet central press, editorials from Peking and Hanoi, and a government statement from Pyongyang.

MOSCOW'S REACTION Moscow propaganda for the most part recapitulates themes prominent at the time of Japan's basic decision last October to extend the duration of the treaty. The prolongation of the pact is said to serve U.S. plans to use Japan as a tool in an aggressive Asian policy, creating a threat to Asian security and redounding chiefly to the detriment of the Japanese people's own interests.

A 23 June article by PRAVDA's Mayevskiy adds a new dimension in picturing "the American people" as also threatened by a pact that abets the revival of Japanese militarism. Mayevskiy, who also authored the most authoritative Soviet comment on the treaty in October, argues that the American people's interests are being harmed by the efforts of U.S. "imperialist circles," under cover of the treaty, to "build up Japanese revanchism" just as they encouraged "German militarism" after World War I and "are doing now" in West Germany.

Mayevskiy pursues standard lines in linking the extension of the treaty with a U.S. desire to turn Japan "into a center for implementing the 'Guam doctrine' and into a gendarme of Asia" as part of a scheme to make Asians fight Asians. Japan's territory is being used now, he says, "for the development of the U.S. intervention in Indochina." This charge recurs in other Soviet comment.

In IZVESTIYA on 23 October, Kudryavtsev depicts a threat to the Soviet Union inherent in U.S.-Japanese military cooperation--a theme raised in the central press in PRAVDA's 16 December 1969 editorial article a month after the Nixon-Sato talks and broached recurrently before and since that time primarily in Moscow broadcasts to Japan. Kudryavtsev says U.S. bases maintained on Japanese soil under the terms of the treaty are "spearheaded

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 34 -

against the Soviet Union and other neighbors" and asserts that "it would be naive" to suppose that such a situation "does not hamper the further development of good-neighborly relations between the Soviet Union and Japan." The notion that Soviet security interests are menaced is also brought up in a routine-level broadcast to Southeast Asia and in several commentaries tailored for the Japanese.

Moscow sustains the practice of attacking Japanese "ruling circles" and avoids criticizing Prime Minister Sato personally.

CHINESE Peking, assailing the "reactionary Sato government,"
COMMENT has played on current themes of Asian communist unity with charges that the treaty constitutes a provocation against the peoples of China, Korea, and Indochina as well as against the Japanese themselves. PEOPLE'S DAILY's 23 June editorial calls the "unequal" treaty "an indentured selling out" of Japanese sovereignty and national interests, "a chain binding Japan to the chariot of U.S. imperialist aggression," and a "serious threat" to peace in Asia and the Pacific. Alleging that U.S. military bases in Japan are used to launch provocations against Indochina, China, and Korea, the editorial says the treaty extension "is meant primarily to suit the urgent needs of U.S. imperialism" and can only bring "calamity" for Japan. It sees abolition of the treaty and overthrow of "the forces of Japanese militarism" as the only way out for the Japanese.

Support for efforts by the Japanese people to abolish the treaty had been expressed in a communique--carried by NCNA on the 20th--on talks between delegations of the Fishery Association of China and the Japan-China Fishery Association. The communique called the Sato government's decision to extend the treaty a serious provocation against the Japanese people and against "the peoples of China, Korea, Indochina, and Asia as a whole." On 25 June, speaking at a banquet for a visiting North Korean delegation, Chou En-lai mentioned the treaty extension briefly in charging that the Sato government "has become even more unbridled in its reactionary arrogance."

As in October when the decision to extend the treaty was made known, Peking media featured accounts of protest rallies and demonstrations in Japan.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 35 -

PYONGYANG STATEMENT Typically egocentric North Korean reaction is expressed in the DPRK Government statement of 19 June and in an echoing NODONG SINMUN editorial of the 22d, both of which call Korea the treaty's "primary target of aggression." Decrying the "vicious maneuvers" of Japan and the United States to reinforce their alliance "against the socialist countries and the national liberation movement in Asia and jointly expand aggressive war throughout Asia," the government statement calls the extension of the treaty "a grave challenge to peace in Asia and the world" and charges the Japanese "militarists" with aggressive designs on China and North Vietnam as well as Korea. The Korean people, the editorial says, "cannot watch with folded arms" the "outright challenge to the Korean people and wanton attack on peace in Asia and the world" represented by the treaty extension.

DRV COMMENT A 23 June editorial in Hanoi's NHAN DAN denounces the treaty extension as "an important landmark in the history of criminal collaboration between aggressive U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarist imperialism" and as "a dangerous development" which "holds a great danger for the Japanese people as well as for peace and security in Asia."

Among several items carried by VNA surrounding the date of the treaty's extension was a 24 June report on a Hanoi meeting of several organizations in support of Japanese action to secure abrogation of the treaty. VNA quoted Mme Le Thi Xuyen, a functionary of the Vietnam Peace Committee, as saying the treaty was "chiefly intended to oppose the Soviet Union and the Asian socialist countries and counter the national liberation movement in Asia."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 36 -

LATIN AMERICA

HAVANA APPLAUDS TACTICS OF URBAN GUERRILLAS IN URUGUAY

Recent Cuban comment on the "Tupamaros," a Uruguayan urban guerrilla organization has gone beyond routine praise for the group's military exploits to allege that its tactics are exemplary and are being used by revolutionaries throughout the southern cone of South America. Havana now also suggests that the Tupamaros, viewing their revolutionary activities in a continental context, are prepared to coordinate their actions with revolutionary groups in neighboring countries.

Cuban media's treatment of the Tupamaros accords with Castro's newly flexible approach to revolutionary strategy, modifying prior insistence on rural-based guerrilla warfare as virtually the only path to continental "liberation." The Cuban leader's new flexibility was crystallized in his Lenin Day speech on 22 April when he remarked that there have never been "two identical cases" in history and commented, with respect to revolutions, that "new possibilities and new ways are being born." The emergent new approach had been reflected over the past two years in Havana media's favorable publicity for urban-based guerrilla activities. In now ascribing an exemplary character to the Tupamaros, Havana comment pictures the group as inspired by the Cuban revolution and by the writings of Che Guevara.

TUPAMAROS AS MODEL The portrayal of the Tupamaros as a model for other revolutionaries has been drawn most clearly in the Cuban communist youth organ JUVENTUD REBELDE, in a front-page commentary on 8 June and in an article in the same issue by Uruguayan leftist journalist Carlos Maria Gutierrez. Applauding the Tupamaros' "tactical ability," the commentary alleged that their tactics have been adopted "in various parts of the southern cone: the great port cities of Argentina, Chile, and southern Brazil." Citing a forecast in the New York TIMES in January 1969 that Uruguay and the Tupamaros would become the United States' major problem in Latin America, the commentary alleged that this "fact" had now been "verified." The Tupamaros' "contagiousness," JUVENTUD REBELDE said, had been a matter of concern of U.S. "experts" for some time, and the New York TIMES had warned that the Uruguayan urban guerrillas could trigger "a new Vietnam."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 37 -

Gutierrez' article, outlining the 'Tupamaros' strategy, noted that the organization advocated "coordination of a liberation struggle for all Latin America"--a struggle which must be waged "without respecting the sometimes artificial borders imposed by the Balkanization of the colonial era or by imperialism."

The JUVENTUD REBELDE commentary did not elaborate on how revolutionaries in neighboring countries had been influenced by the Tupamaros. A 22 November 1969 Radio Havana commentary, however, was more specific. It declared that such groups as the Brazilian revolutionaries who kidnapped U.S. Ambassador Elbrick last September and the Chilean Leftist Revolutionary Movement, which has recently engaged in armed actions, owe "a moral debt" to the Tupamaros for having "started a new form of struggle" within the cities.

INSPIRATION The Gutierrez article emphasized the Tupamaros' FROM HAVANA ideological affinity with Havana, stating that their "tactical concepts" have been "most influenced" by "the example of the Cuban revolution and . . . the theoretical works of Che Guevara." He observed that in subscribing to a coordinated continental revolutionary struggle, the Tupamaros "agree with the thesis" of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (IASO), an organization founded in Havana in 1967 which now appears to be moribund.

Gutierrez said the Tupamaros group advocates "creation of armed groups prior to the appearance of proper conditions for armed struggle" and believes that "revolutionary action in itself . . . generates awareness, organization, and revolutionary conditions." This thesis in fact parallels one that Castro articulated prior to the debacle suffered by Che Guevara's Bolivian venture in 1967. Gutierrez went on to maintain, in opposition to the orthodox Latin American communist view, that proper revolutionary conditions are not a necessary prerequisite to launching an armed struggle because the struggle itself will generate the necessary "subjective" conditions.

The question of possible Cuban material aid to the Tupamaros has never been broached directly in Havana propaganda. A leaflet distributed by the Tupamaros after carrying out an assault

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 38 -

on the city of Pando on 8 October, in honor of the anniversary of Che Guevara's death, was quoted by PRENSA LATINA on 17 October as stating: "We take from the enemy the weapons we need. We do not seek funds from abroad with which to finance our revolution. We take from our enemies the money we need to set up our revolutionary apparatus." PRENSA LATINA's correspondent in Montevideo, however, advised his Havana office in an information dispatch on 18 June of "quite an objective study" of the Tupamaros in the Brazilian press which stated that "many Tupamaros cadres, several dozen, . . . went to Cuba and were duly trained."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI3 TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 39 -

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

HARDLINERS DENOUNCE DUBCEK; HUSAK HINTS AT TRIAL

Following his final expulsion from the Czechoslovak Communist Party, announced in a Central Committee plenum resolution on 26 June, Alexander Dubcek has been subjected to vicious public attacks by hardlining CPCZ Secretariat members Miroslav Moc and Alois Indra. First Secretary Husak, while refraining from such direct attacks, has pointedly stressed that the party has been too lenient until now in punishing "violators."

The Central Committee, according to CTK's excerpts of the plenum resolution, "confirmed the expulsion of Alexander Dubcek from the ranks of members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia"--from which he had previously been "suspended"--as well as "his recall from the post of deputy of the House of the People and recall from his post as Czechoslovak ambassador to Turkey." The party dramatized the expulsion by making it the only major party personnel action of the session; the only other shift of any consequence was the elevation of CSSR Deputy Premier Miloslav Hruskovic to the rank of CPCZ Secretary.

ATTACKS BY RUDE PRAVO Chief Editor Moc, writing in the issue
MOC, INDRA of the 29th, descends to the level of charging
that Dubcek "failed to fulfill his duties ensuing
from his position as Czechoslovak ambassador abroad." Moc calls
the expulsion "only a logical consummation of Dubcek's violation
of party rules" and his "double-faced policy"--an epithet here-
tofore applied only to Smrkovsky--and adds such charges as
"ideological capitulation," "capitulation to counterrevolutionary
forces," and "responsibility for violating internationalist
relations and the alliance with the CPSU" and its allies. Moc
concludes with a warning that "we shall not allow antisocialist
forces to decide that Dubcek's expulsion concludes another
chapter."

A 29 June CTK report quotes CPCZ Presidium candidate and Secretary Indra as telling a party aktiv in Usti nad Labem that the plenum "made a definitive full-stop to the case of Alexander Dubcek, whose responsibility for the disastrous developments in the years 1968 and 1969 has been fully proved after thorough party investigation." A briefer account of Indra's speech carried in the Prague domestic service the same day, however, does not include the direct attack on Dubcek.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 40 -

COMMENTS Speaking at a peace rally in Brno-Lisen on the
BY HUSAK 28th, carried live in the Prague domestic service,
Gustav Husak manifested his greatest sensitivity
to date to "Western" opposition to the CPCZ's hardline course
as exemplified by the plenum action against Dubcek. He assured
his listeners that nobody need fear "for his own security, even
though the people from the West continuously talk about what
trials we would hold in our country and what terror we are
making here." But he added that "we have been in certain cases
too generous toward certain people" who "do not deserve such
generosity as we have displayed in the past year." In a
transparent allusion to his former Presidium colleague Dubcek,
Husak invoked a saying by the Stalinist Gottwald: "Brother
or not, come down from the pear tree," declaring in this
context that "the weight of the law will strike the violator
of the law and this could not, as a matter of fact, be other-
wise."

The CPCZ Presidium report delivered by Husak at the 25 June
session of the Central Committee plenum, printed in full in
RUDE PRAVO on the 27th, is relatively moderate overall. It
decries "manifestations of liberalism and of a conciliatory
attitude" in interviews connected with the "exchange of party
cards," a recurrent theme of recent Prague propaganda. It also
claims successes in overcoming the 1968-69 depredations of the
"rightist opportunists" in political affairs, the communications
media, the economy, and foreign affairs.

In what is apparently his major public rationale for the recall
of Dubcek as ambassador to Turkey, Husak declares: "The
experience of 1968 showed that the implementation of the
party line in the field of external political and commercial
relations can be ensured only by people who stand firmly on the
position of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, and
who are personally convinced of the correctness of the party
policy. This must be a permanent lesson for us."

ITALIAN, BRITISH COMMUNISTS "REGRET" DUBCEK EXPULSION

The ouster of Dubcek, reported without comment by the Soviet
radio and central press, has drawn prompt public condemnation
from two West European communist parties.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 41 -

In the 27 June issue of the Italian CP's L'UNITA, party Secretary General Longo declared: "We regret and deplore the expulsion." He commented that such actions cannot contribute in a positive way to solving the political situation in Czechoslovakia. On 29 June, under the heading "Deep Regret at Expulsion of Dubcek," the British CP's MORNING STAR recalled "Comrade" Dubcek's "long service to the party and the cause of socialism, including his role in the anti-Hitler struggle." Taking note of Longo's statement in L'UNITA on the expulsion, MORNING STAR added a reminder that Dubcek's contribution to eradicating the "deformations" of Novotny had been "publicly acknowledged by the new leadership" of the Czechoslovak party.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 42 -

YUGOSLAVIA AND USSR

RIBICIC MOSCOW VISIT REFLECTS IMPROVEMENT IN STATE RELATIONS

Yugoslav Premier Ribicic's 24-30 June visit to Moscow--the first high-level official Yugoslav visit to the Soviet Union since the intervention in Czechoslovakia--underscores mutual efforts to improve relations on the state level despite continuing serious differences in ideology, interparty relations, and foreign policy.

Soviet assurances that the 1955 Belgrade declaration and other documents on relations between the two governments are still valid constitute a further attempt to repair the damage done to relations with Yugoslavia by the invasion of Czechoslovakia.* Moscow's moves to improve its ties with Belgrade have coincided with efforts to counter Chinese attempts to gain leverage in Eastern Europe. Belgrade and Peking have been normalizing economic and diplomatic ties in recent months. The development of Moscow's conciliatory posture also comes at a time when preparations are underway for the third nonaligned summit in Lusaka in September, when the Yugoslavs may be expected to reiterate their traditional antipathy to power blocs; Moscow may hope to forestall or mitigate use of the meeting as a forum for censure of Soviet policies specifically.

The Yugoslavs, for their part, appear willing to mute their criticism of Soviet policies and to play down areas of discord in exchange for improved economic relations with the Soviet Union and its allies.

COMMUNIQUE ON TALKS WITH SOVIET LEADERS The 30 June communique on Ribicic's visit, which included talks with Kosygin and Polgornyy, reasserts the principles of "respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality, noninterference in each other's affairs, and mutual respect." The existence of "certain differences of approach to certain questions," the document says, "should not hinder

* During his September 1969 visit to Belgrade, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko gave similar assurances of Soviet adherence to the 1955 Belgrade declaration.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 43 -

the development of normal and friendly mutual relations." Both sides registered a desire to develop further economic cooperation and stressed "the importance of joint efforts to formulate a new five-year trade agreement for the 1971-75 period."

Describing the atmosphere of the talks as "frank and friendly," the communique adds that views were "exchanged" on bilateral relations, political and economic cooperation, and "urgent international problems." Pointing to areas of agreement on foreign policy, it records joint support for the Vietnamese and all Indochinese peoples and condemns Israel's "aggressive" actions. It also reaffirms both sides' support for a European security conference and notes the "great importance" both attach to improving relations with West Germany.

Obscuring the areas of disagreement, the communique says merely that the Yugoslav Government "acquainted" the Soviet side with the principles of its nonalignment policy and the importance of the forthcoming Lusaka summit. The document predictably ignores the sensitive issue of China and steers clear of any reference to interparty relations. Premier Kosygin, the document concludes, has accepted an invitation to visit Belgrade at a date to be fixed later.

KOSYGIN, RIBICIC
LUNCHEON SPEECHES

A mutual desire to seek further cooperation despite persisting differences was also the central theme of speeches by Kosygin and Ribicic at a luncheon in Moscow on 24 June. The Soviet Premier, as quoted by Radio Moscow on 24 June, called for "comradely discussion of all questions to enable us to remove by joint effort all that hampers the development of Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation." He went on to point "with satisfaction" to the "closeness or coincidence" of views between the two countries on European security, the Middle East, and Indochina. He concluded by assuring the Yugoslavs that the USSR is "firmly resolved to continue to be guided" by the principles of "socialist internationalism, equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in the domestic affairs of others."

In a similar vein, the Yugoslav Premier expressed a readiness for improved Soviet-Yugoslav relations but made it clear that this could not occur at the expense of Belgrade's independent, nonaligned policy. In his remarks as reported in PRAVDA on the 25th, he acknowledged that "certain

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 44 -

differences" remain between the two countries, advocating further talks as the best way to promote understanding and laying particular emphasis on Belgrade's desire to intensify economic cooperation. He went on to declare that the "criteria" for such cooperation must be "mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference, and equality." Predictably, he made no mention of "socialist internationalism.

Without naming any countries, but with Belgrade's conspicuously improved relations with Peking and the forthcoming Lusaka summit clearly in the background, Ribicic emphasized that "as a socialist and nonaligned" state Yugoslavia will continue to pursue good relations with "all" countries. In an apparent dig at Moscow's Indochina policy, he pointed out that Yugoslavia had supported the Vietnamese people from the beginning and has recognized the new Sihanouk government as well as the PRG in South Vietnam. Although he went on to cite Vietnam as confirmation that "no outside force can crush the resistance of a people struggling for their freedom and independence," the implications of his remark for the Soviets seemed obvious.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

1 JULY 1970

- 45 -

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

BREZHNEV'S WAR ROLE PLAYED UP BY OGONEK, OTHERWISE IGNORED

The mass-circulation magazine OGONEK, in its issue dated 13 June, published an article on a 12 May reunion of World War II veterans of the 18th Soviet Army. The author is Col. S.A. Borzenko, formerly a reporter with the 18th Army and in recent years Brezhnev's most faithful panegyrist. True to form, Borzenko devoted the bulk of his article to Brezhnev, who attended the reunion; he lauded especially Brezhnev's role in the Novorossiysk operation, the only battle in which Brezhnev was prominently involved.

Recalling Brezhnev's presence in the thick of the Novorossiysk battle, Borzenko declared that

the entire army, from commander to private, knew Brezhnev; he was their favorite, he knew their attitudes and thoughts and was able to kindle their desire for victory. How many times the will of this man made the impossible possible! At the most critical moments of the battle he found fiery words which had a quick and powerful effect. On the beachhead the chief of the political department cemented the steadfastness of the troops and more than once displayed personal bravery and iron coolness.

The article was accompanied by a picture of Brezhnev surrounded by the other veterans.

The OGONEK article was, however, unique, and as on other similar occasions in past years the central press in general passed up the opportunity to try to build up Brezhnev's wartime role. The only other lengthy report on the reunion, in LITERARY GAZETTE on 3 June, contained no praise for Brezhnev, although it did refer several times to his leading role at the meeting. RED STAR on 13 May reported the meeting in three paragraphs, noting that Brezhnev was present. The other central papers did not report on the reunion at all.

In September 1968, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Novorossiysk operation, OGONEK carried an article that played up Brezhnev's wartime role in similar fashion and called on

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 46 -

journalists and historians "not to forget to portray the impressive panorama of battles" at Novorossiysk. At that time, PRAVDA's anniversary article also stressed Brezhnev's heroism during the campaign, but the other central papers did not do so and Grechko's IZVESTIYA article seemed even to belittle Brezhnev's role.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 47 -

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

JOINT EDITORIAL RELEASED FOR PARTY ANNIVERSARY

A joint RED FLAG/PEOPLE'S DAILY/LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial, released on 30 June, marked this year's undramatic celebration of the 49th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. The editorial claims no new advances in the protracted campaign to rebuild the party, nor does it break any new ground in the propaganda surrounding the party-building effort. It fails to reiterate the demands in the joint anniversary editorial last year for the formation of strong cores of leadership within revolutionary committees at all levels and for the rebuilding of the Young Communist League. Concentrating largely on a hackneyed repetition of the ideological criteria for new party members, the editorial concludes by calling for "great achievements in party consolidation and party building" to greet the party's 50th anniversary next year. The implication is that party rebuilding will continue to be a very gradual process.

Although the editorial contains the usual verbiage about reliance on the masses for guidance in party building, it is not as firm on this point as last year's editorial, which made public a Mao instruction specifically calling for the rebuilding of each party branch with the participation of masses outside the party. Approaching the subject more cautiously, perhaps with the aim of insulating party members against undisciplined factional groups, this year's editorial sets limits on the volume of criticism the masses may direct at party members. It argues that "if a man makes mistakes" but conducts self-criticism and accepts criticism by others, "he is a good comrade" and additional criticism is unnecessary.

TOPICS IN BRIEF

STATUS OF An airport reception for delegations returning
YEH CHUN from the Korean War anniversary observance in
 Pyongyang provides the first indicator since
the Ninth Congress of the standing of Yeh Chun, Lin Piao's
wife. Prior to the congress, she had been listed toward the
end of the "top 14," and since that time she has appeared
only on occasions when leaders were listed in stroke order.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 48 -

For the airport reception, however, she followed Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan in the Politburo rankings, which were divided into groups. The Chiang-Yao-Yeh grouping, all considered cultural revolution "leftists," was listed first after the Standing Committee. Li Hsien-nien followed, ahead of army deputy chiefs of staff Wu Fa-hsien and Chiu Hui-tso. During May Li was listed behind Wu; now he is apparently ahead of Wu, at least for civilian functions.

LEAP FORWARD Provincial broadcasts continue to stress the
PLANNING necessity for an economic "leap forward" in
 industrial aid to agriculture. A Heilungkiang
conference on local industries publicized by Harbin radio on
22 June specified that local industry must "make overall
plans," while the provincial authorities must in turn be
responsible for unified arrangements in order to guarantee
"balanced development of various industries." But a joint
HUPEH DAILY-YANGTSE DAILY article broadcast on 19 June
seems to imply disagreement with those who stress the need
for careful planning and orderly development. The article
admits that the campaign to increase productivity "may seem
a little chaotic," but indicates that chaos may be necessary
"to foster the activism and initiative of the working
class." Revolutionary workers "have broken the conventions
and set aside old frames of reference, foreign ways and old
methods What is so bad about chaos?" While the
article then backtracks with the comment that chaos is
correct only if it does not deviate from Mao's thought, its
acceptance of short-term economic disorder seems at variance
with the general concentration on the need for speedy results
economically, as typified by the common argument that small
local industry must be supported because it can produce much
in very little time.

SUMMER CROPS Although "leap forward" rhetoric persists in
 the propaganda, harvest claims made recently
by Peking do not suggest that leap forward results are being
achieved in agriculture. An NCNA report on 19 June claimed
only "good" harvests for Honan, Shantung, Kiangsu, and
Shensi; it was noted that each province had to "overcome
natural disasters." Wheat yields were said to exceed last
year's in Kiangsu and Honan, but there were no claims of
record crops. "Estimated" wheat yields were said to be up
for Peking and Hopei, according to a 21 June NCNA survey,
but Shansi was said to have achieved only a "fairly good"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
1 JULY 1970

- 49 -

wheat harvest after numerous natural disasters. On 23 June NCNA released a statement claiming "rich" harvests in the major grain-growing areas of China, but again there was no claim of record harvests. Areas in southeast China, including the Szechwan breadbasket, are said to have achieved gains in total output of 20 percent this summer over last year, but the absence of enthusiastic adjectives to describe the harvest may indicate that last year's harvest was very poor, not that this year's crop is exceptional.

CONFIDENTIAL